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ABSTRACT
Presented here is an exploratory study that compared four kinds of
extremists (violent lone, nonviolent lone, violent group member, and
nonviolent group member). Thematic analysis of 40 case studies
identified five key themes and a number of subthemes that com-
prised a range of underlying variables. Comparisons of the four
groups showed that in many ways violent and nonviolent extremists
acting alone or as part of a group do not differ. However there were
some variables that distinguished between groups. Findings are dis-
cussed in terms of implications for countering and preventing violent
extremism.
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Introduction
Long before the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the fast growth of support for the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), research has sought to understand why, when and how
people become radicalized and form or join groups in order to conduct acts of terror-
ism. However, those responsible for preventing or disrupting such acts also need to
understand and recognize the threat posed by lone (or very small numbers of) individu-
als known to hold and seemingly be motivated by extremist views, who are not operat-
ing as part of a wider group or under any formal organizational structure. Some groups
and organizations such as Al-Qaeda (AQ) and movements such as the Far Right have
called for a ‘leaderless resistance’; aiming to inspire individuals to conduct acts of vio-
lence within their own communities without direction from traditional command and
control means. AQ and ISIS have portrayed terrorism as an entrepreneurial arena where
anyone can take part, and have called for their supporters to conduct attacks without
any official direction or support. For example, ‘… an emerging strategy for AQ was “to
empower and motivate individuals to commit acts of violence completely outside any
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terrorist chain of command”’.1 This has led, at least in part, to small groups doing just
this, as well as individuals conducting acts of terrorism alone.
There are several fairly recent high-profile examples of lone actor attacks that demon-
strate this. First, in 2011 Anders Breivik detonated a bomb and went on a shooting
spree in Norway, killing 77 members of the public, many of these being teenage chil-
dren. Breivik was reported to be acting on his extreme right-wing views and was appar-
ently operating alone.1 More recently, in 2017 in the U.K. alone there were three
significant lone actor terrorist attacks – on Westminster Bridge, at the Manchester
arena, and in Finsbury Park. Finally, we note the devastating attack on two mosques in
New Zealand in 2019 that led to the killing of 50 innocent individuals. Whilst lone
actor violence is not new, these examples demonstrate that the threat is current and can
be high in impact, for example in terms of numbers of deaths and casualties caused,
economic and social effects, and the media attention they attract.
The current study compared case studies of (violent and nonviolent) group-based
and lone actor extremists, in order to identify similarities and differences between these.
This contributes to the recent surge of empirical research that seeks to understand lone
actor terrorism;2 which in turn builds on research that focuses on terrorists who operate
as part of a group. Previously, the terrorism literature tended to describe the process of
radicalization and terrorism as social phenomena, with terrorist attacks generally com-
mitted by groups.3 This showed that different mechanisms may be at work for different
individuals;4 therefore there are multiple and diverse pathways that lead to extremist-
related actions. These can be determined by broad grievances (‘push’ factors), more spe-
cific ‘pull’ factors (that attract individuals to terrorism), and ‘protective’ factors that lead
to some people being more vulnerable or receptive to push or pull factors.5 This is also
true of lone actor terrorists; however, more research is needed to understand the simi-
larities and differences between different types of terrorist actors. We need to under-
stand how, when and why some choose to act alone while others work as part of a
group, and how, when and why some choose to conduct acts of violence whilst others
do not.
Theoretically, we would expect lone and group member extremists to be driven by
different factors. For example, group membership can involve peer pressure and/or lead
to a number of psychological rewards. Therefore group member extremists may be
motivated to conform and impress other members in order to be accepted and to main-
tain their membership and status within the group. In contrast, lone actors might
choose to conduct a violent attack because they perceive groups to be insufficiently
extreme, and therefore they feel more of a personal responsibility to act in order to
achieve extremist goals. In terms of violent versus nonviolent extremists, we should also
expect differences in the factors that underlie their behavior. For example, extremists
may be violent because, for different reasons, they have the capability for violence,
whilst nonviolent extremists may opt for nonviolent action because they are operating
in an environment that constrains their options for developing a capability for violence.
Therefore terrorists are a heterogeneous group that need to be investigated as such.6
1Despite Breivik’s insistence that he was in contact with at least six other radicals, the Commanding Police Chief
reported that there was no evidence to suggest these contacts actually existed.
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Recent research has compared different types of extremism. For example, an analysis
of AQ identified five kinds of members (active participants, aspirants, facilitators,
trained aspirants, and ideologues), varying in in terms of how operationally active they
are.7 Others have compared violence in ideological and nonideological groups,8 lone
versus group-based terrorists,9 and violent versus nonviolent extremists.10 Knight,
Woodward and Lancaster (2017) identified some factors that distinguished between
those with similarly extremist views that chose to act violently versus those who did
not.11 The present study builds on this current understanding of terrorism by investigat-
ing a number of case studies to further investigate the similarities and differences
between violent and nonviolent extremists, and also between those who acted as part of
a group and those who acted alone. Understanding when the mechanisms underlying
different behavioral outcomes (e.g. to act violently or not, alone or as part of a group)
is important to better understand, predict, prevent and disrupt their actions. Empirical
studies of this nature are relatively rare, mainly due to methodological constraints
meaning that access to sufficient, appropriate, detailed data is difficult. The goal was to
generate new understanding of these different types of extremists in order to assist
Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) practitioners respon-
sible for the prevention, detection, assessment and/or treatment of these different kinds
of individuals to do so using an evidenced based approach.
Methods
Sample
The aim of this exploratory study2 is to understand how certain types of extremists are
similar and how they are different, in terms of variables underlying different behavioral
outcomes (to act violently or not, alone or as part of a group). The sample comprised
of 40 detailed case studies of individuals to compare four groups: violent lone extremists
(VLEs, n¼ 9), violent group-based extremists (VGEs, n¼ 15), nonviolent lone extrem-
ists (NVLEs, n¼ 9) and nonviolent group-based extremists (NVGEs, n¼ 7). Both
Islamic and right-wing extremists (XRW) were included.3
Defining and categorizing case studies
Data were gathered on individuals who had been convicted of a criminal offense (vio-
lent or nonviolent) in the U.K. since 2001, where there was evidence that this was in
some way motivated by extremism (see ‘Case Selection and case study development’
later for further details). The term ‘extremist’ was used to mean those holding attitudes
and beliefs that did not fit with mainstream opinion regarding political, religious and/or
ideological issues. It is recognized that defining extremism and categorizing individuals
can be complex and, at times, controversial. The current study took a pragmatic
2Referred to as ‘exploratory due to the small sample size and variance in missing data for some cases and for some
underlying variables. Gathering sufficient information to make inclusion and analysis of data meaningful is a common
challenge for research in this area. However, limitations regarding the data do not preclude analysis of qualitative
information to highlight key trends and to develop meaningful insights.
3This was deemed appropriate since the majority of terrorist prisoners in the UK fall in to one of these two groups.
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approach to select individuals, including individuals who had been identified and
described as extremist by writers in this field, including academics and CT experts and
practitioners, rather than relying on or using newspaper/mainstream media accounts.
The sample comprised those who were integrated within and operated as part of an
extremist group, as well as those who operated alone. Group members included individ-
uals who had planned, prepared and/or conducted an extremist-related (violent or non-
violent) action as part of an extremist group. To be categorized as a lone extremist, the
individual must have planned, or have been planning, to execute the plot alone. That is,
they may be linked with others (closely or otherwise, including online networks), but
not governed at a tactical level. They may have been previously part of a group but
then left and proceeded to act outside of a formal group structure. Others included
those who may have been trained and equipped by a group (who may also have selected
targets) but conducted acts autonomously. One isolated dyad4 was also included.
In terms of categorizing individuals as violent or nonviolent, violence was defined as
any act which constituted, or any potential act which, if carried out would constitute,
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, culpable homicide, assault, and/or real injury
to another, and/or cause serious and significant structural damage. An individual was
categorized as violent if they had actually conducted physical acts of violence, or know-
ingly and actively facilitated violence conducted by others (e.g. by providing explosives
and/or weapons). We decided to categorize as ‘violent’ those individuals who intention-
ally and actively facilitated an act of violence (e.g. made an Improvised Explosive
Device - IED), but did not actually conduct the violent act (e.g. detonate an IED). This
is because it did not seem sensible to categorize an individual such as a bomb maker as
‘nonviolent’. Those categorized as nonviolent had conducted actions such as sending
racist hate mail and sharing violent extremist literature.
Case selection and case study development
Case Study Research (CSR) is a rigorous approach that can uncover small but concrete
factors that may be key to understanding a phenomenon.12 Research involving the ana-
lysis of specific cases can provide a depth of understanding of the intricacies and rela-
tionships that accurately reflects reality.13 Each extremist individual is referred to here
as a ‘case’. Strategic selection was applied to identify cases that represented a range of
exemplars from the four groups to confirm or challenge propositions and hypotheses.14
Thus, cases that represented the four groups of interest were chosen, ensuring ‘diversity
across contexts’:15 Cases that provided opportunities to examine and understand simi-
larities and differences between VLEs, VGEs, NVLEs and NVGEs.
An initial pool of cases was developed comprising the names of individual extremists
identified via previously published research in this area, government reports and subject
matter expert (SME) advice on individuals who might be included for analysis. Cases
that clearly fitted into one of the four categories were developed further using open
source data in order to gather as much information as possible on the individuals.
Information was cross-checked where possible; three researchers independently gathered
4A dyad is a pair of individuals who operated independently from a group in terms of planning, preparation and so on,
without direct input from a wider network. Previous lone actor research has also included dyads in their analyses.
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and collated data and then collaborated to identify overlaps, gaps in understanding and
conflicting information. Where possible, triangulation allowed verification of details,
whilst where evidence was lacking (e.g. only found in one report and therefore could
not be verified) this was removed from the case study. This is because it is more
important to provide a valid framework based on solid verified information than create
a framework based on more information but reduced validity.16
Case study development ended when no new cases fitting our definitions and inclu-
sion criteria, and no further information regarding each individual case, could be
found.5 Three researchers were then required to independently read each case study
and assign it to one of the four groups of extremists. The lead researcher then examined
these and excluded cases when the three researchers were unable to agree on how to
categorize a case; and also when the quantity6 and quality7 of information for a case
was insubstantial. Initially, a total of 56 case studies were developed. However, during
the categorization stage of the study 16 of these were excluded, resulting in 40 case
studies to be analyzed in full.8
Findings are based on the analysis of these 40 case studies representing extremists
who were operating and planning to conduct/had conducted an offense in the U.K.,
post 2001. Violent cases mainly included attacks (or plots that were foiled via external
intervention) that attempted and intended to kill others, whereas nonviolent cases
included possession of, writing, distributing and/or disseminating extremist or terrorist
literature, sending racist ‘hate mail’, and fund raising to support terrorist activities.
Analytical approach
In the present study, thematic analysis was conducted to identify “repeated patterns of
meaning” across the set of data,17 and content analysis was applied to analyze multiple
case studies in order to compare the four groups of extremists. This study applied a
multiple case study approach, whereby collections of case studies (representing the four
groups of extremists) were categorized, compared and contrasted. Owing to the nature
of this exploratory research, formal hypotheses were not made a priori; instead,
researchers assessed the data from a bottom-up approach, allowing themes and
5This was the case for VLEs, NVLEs, and NVGEs. However, there were many more VGE cases that were available for
inclusion, but we made a pragmatic decision to stop developing case studies when we had reached an n of 15 for
this group.
6We did not have a set criterion regarding the quantity of information required. Decisions regarding whether there was
a sufficient amount of data were made by the lead researchers and were based on the information found during case
study development. Cases were included if the information found appeared to provide a detailed picture of the
individual in terms of who they were, their offence(s), and factors that were likely to relate to their actions.
7‘Quality’ referred to whether key information could be verified via more than one source. Information that was
reported via only one source was deemed of insufficient quality and therefore excluded.
8Categorization of case studies was an iterative process. Researchers were required to allocate 56 case studies into one
of the four categories, according to pre-defined definitions for each of these. The initial attempt was unsuccessful, and
there were a number of disagreements between the researchers. It was clear that the definitions initially developed (for
violent/ non-violent, and lone/ group member) did not adequately distinguish between categories, leading to a lack of
agreement regarding how a number of the case studies should be categorized. Therefore definitions were refined and
researchers repeated the categorization task. Whilst there was agreement for the majority of cases, sixteen cases could
not be categorized, mainly because lack of detailed information meant that it was not clear whether individuals were
violent or non-violent and/ or lone extremists or group members. These were excluded from the analyses, as
recommended by Stake (2006), who suggested that inclusion/ exclusion is determined by the degree and the extent
that cases are perceived to ‘fit’, with regards to the topic(s) of interest.
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understanding to emerge and then related these back to the literature to check for con-
sistency or contrast. Analyses aimed to (a) identify themes, subthemes and variables
that emerged from analysis of the data as a whole (i.e. key factors underlying extremism
in general9), and then (b) compare the different types of extremists regarding these fac-
tors in order to understand similarities and differences between groups. In preparation
for analysis, data for each case study were double-spaced, lines were numbered and
wide margins created. This allowed for thoughts and comments to be recorded in mar-
gins, and systematic notes were also made in a separate notebook. These provide a
paper trail and evidence for codes, themes and patterns that emerged and allowed
researchers to compare notes and agree on coding schemes.
The entire dataset were first examined via thematic analysis to identify characteristics
and features of all four groups. That is, we did not distinguish cases by the subgroups
to which they belonged, but read all case studies in-depth several times, in order to
identify characteristics and themes that were shared across the subgroups.
The following stages were followed:
Stage 1: Read through to familiarize self with cases, individually and then as a group.
Stage 2: Initial coding and made notes regarding themes, sub-themes, connections
and patterns. The reading of the entire dataset led the reader to identify occurrences
that were reported regularly throughout. These were grouped into ‘themes’, ‘sub-
themes’ and ‘underlying variables’. ‘Themes’ enabled an overarching, general way to
categorize differences in data at the highest level. ‘Sub-themes’ were those that ‘sat
under’ each main theme, and these comprised ‘underlying variables’ (see Figure 1).
So, for example, through reading the data, certain factors were observed to occur
Figure 1. Overarching themes and subthemes underlying extremism.
9A bottom-up approach was taken in that we did not have a priori themes, rather we allowed themes to emerge from
the data.
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regularly, such as a reference to a person’s psychological state. A reference to a spe-
cific psychological state (e.g. they were described by others as ‘obsessional’) was
noted, and this was categorized as an ‘underlying variable’, which sat under the
sub-theme entitled ‘psychological issues’, which in turn sat under the main theme
entitled ‘Circumstances and life experiences’.
The continuous re-reading of text enables the reader to identify commonalities and
differences within the text, and it is the commonalities that lead to the formation of
themes and sub-themes, and the differences that lead to an understanding of the pat-
terns and relationships between these and their meaning.
Stage 3: Color code to clarify themes, sub-themes, and underlying variables, and note
patterns and reemerging relationships.
Stage 4: First write-up of overarching themes, and initial understanding of similarities
and differences between groups.
Stage 5: Write-up of the analysis and observations so far, clarify and verify ideas, fur-
ther explore themes, sub-themes and underlying variables, and nuances, patterns
and relationships between these.
Stage 6: Clearly label and describe all themes, sub-themes and underlying variables in
order to examine each case for evidence – to compare between groups (see below).
Throughout the analysis researchers were required to ensure that themes and subthemes
are evidence-based (i.e. the data demonstrates regular commonalities and differences).
When the thematic analysis was complete and themes, subthemes and underlying var-
iables were established, each case was examined for evidence of each of the underlying
variables. When there was evidence, the case study was given a score of ‘1’ (i.e. that
variable was evident for that individual) and a score of ‘0’ if not. Findings are presented
below, to demonstrate the number of cases in each group for which there was evidence
for each of the underlying variables, in order to compare and identify similarities and
differences between the four kinds of extremists.
Results and Discussion
Descriptives
Details regarding the case studies and basic descriptive information are reported in
Tables 1 and 2 below.
In terms of the length of case studies, some groups clearly yielded more information
than others, with the VLE group producing the most detailed cases, and the NVGE pro-
ducing the least. The word count of all 40 case studies was 68,750 (i.e. the total dataset)
with a range of between 428-5257 words.10 Data available enabled a higher number of
VGEs to be included compared to other groups, and the VLE case studies generated
considerably more information than the other groups.11 The smallest group comprised
10Cases varied in length within all groups.
11This indicates a possible reporting bias, mentioned later in the Discussion section.
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NVGEs; cases studies were more difficult to identify and develop for these types of indi-
viduals because they did not seem to attract as much interest or attention from those
reporting on such cases.
Most cases related to Islamic extremism, and the XRW were represented mostly in
the VLE group.12 The mean age was between 25-34 years, with VGEs being the
youngest and NVLEs being the oldest. The majority of cases were male although the
NVLE group comprised 3 (out of 9) females. It was interesting to note that none of
the XRW were female and there were no XRW individuals in the groups (VGE
and NVGE).
Groups also varied regarding religion, race and citizenship (see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that religion differed across groups: group members (violent and non-
violent) were all Muslim, whilst lone extremists were a mix of Muslim and others for
whom had no religion or religion was unknown (most likely because these were XRW).
In terms of race, again the picture was mixed, with the VLE subgroup standing out due
the prevalence of White British cases, group members (violent and nonviolent) compris-
ing mainly British Asian and African, and NVLEs being more varied. Finally, in terms
of citizenship, the groups varied dramatically, with VLEs comprising all British
Table 2. Religion, race and citizenship across groups of extremists (figures represent % of cases).
VLE (n¼ 9) VGE (n¼ 15) NVLE (n¼ 9) NVGE (n¼ 7)
Religion Muslim 22.2 80 77.8 100
Muslim convert 22.2 20 0 0
Unknown/ none 55.6 0 22.2 0
Race White British 66.7 0 11.1 0
Mixed race 11.1 6.7 0 0
British Asian 22.2 46.6 55.6 57.1
African 0 40 22.2 42.9
(Non-British) Asian 0 6.7 0 0
Unknown 0 0 22.2 0
Citizenship British National 100 0 22.2 0
Immigrant, legal British citizenship 0 60 22.2 28.6
Second generation immigrant 0 33.3 55.6 28.6
Illegal immigrant 0 0 0 28.6
Born in UK, grew up in Pakistan 0 6.7 0 0
Unknown 0 0 0 14.2
Table 1. Basic descriptives for each group of extremists.
VLE VGE NVLE NVGE TOTAL
Number of case studies 9 15 9 7 N ¼ 40
Word count for case studies M ¼ 2490.78 M ¼ 1452.53 M ¼ 1395.89 M ¼ 962.14 M ¼ 1587.57
(Mean; Standard Deviation; range) SD ¼ 1516.65
(836-5257)
SD ¼ 648.53
(616-2575)
SD ¼ 1153.82
(428-4166)
SD ¼ 371.77
(567-1684)
SD ¼ 1091.39
Type of extremism IS ¼ 4 IS ¼ 15 IS ¼ 7 IS ¼ 7 IS ¼ 33
(Islamic; XRW) XRW ¼ 5 XRW ¼ 0 XRW ¼ 2 XRW ¼ 0 XRW ¼ 7
Age M ¼ 28.22 M ¼ 25.6 M ¼ 34.11 M ¼ 28.42 M ¼ 28.6
(Mean; Standard Deviation) SD ¼ 9.47 SD ¼ 5.42 SD ¼ 14.97 SD ¼ 3.95 SD ¼ 9.37
Gender M ¼ 8 M ¼ 15 M ¼ 6 M ¼ 7 M ¼ 36
(Male; Female) F ¼ 1 F ¼ 0 F ¼ 3 F ¼ 0 F ¼ 4
12A notable proportion of the lone extremists were XRW rather than Islamic extremists: This is similar to other studies
that have shown that lone actor terrorism does seem to appeal to the XRW (compared to group extremists – more of
whom tend to be religiously inspired).
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Nationals, VGEs comprising mainly first and second generation immigrants, and both
nonviolent subgroups demonstrating more variance.
Emergent themes and between-groups comparisons
Due to the small sample size, no inferential statistics were conducted. However, case
study materials provided both broad and in-depth quantitative and qualitative data,
which enabled comparison of the four different types of extremists. Thematic analysis
identified five key inter-related themes: (i) ‘Circumstances and life experiences’; (ii)
‘Capability and opportunity’; (iii) ‘Grievances’; (iv) ‘Identity’; and (v) ‘Connectedness’
(see Figure 113). Each of these comprised a number of subthemes and underlying varia-
bles. Findings presented below include descriptive statistics to understand where the
largest between-groups differences were found. In the text below the results are
described and also explored in relation to previous research in order to make sense of
the findings and to interpret their meaning.
Theme 1: Circumstances and life experiences
The first theme related to the circumstances and life experiences of individuals and
comprised two subthemes: (i) ‘psychological issues’,14 such as suffering from mental ill-
ness, or being described as ‘obsessional’; and (ii) potentially traumatic events such as
being a refugee, or experiencing the loss (death or long term separation from) of a par-
ent and/or sibling (in some cases it was more than one of these). Table 3 presents how
many (number and percentage of) each group demonstrated evidence for each of the
Table 3. Circumstances and life experiences across groups of extremists (n and %).
Subthemes Underlying variables VLE VGE NVLE NVGE
Psychological issues Asperger syndrome 1 (11.1%) 0 0 0
Depression 3 (33.3%) 0 2 (22.2%) 0
Suicidal 2 (22.2%) 0 1 (11.1%) 0
Personality disorder 1 (11.1%) 0 1 (11.1%) 0
Schizophrenic 1 (11.1%) 0 0 0
Fantasist/ narcissm 3 (33.3%) 0 3 (33.3%) 0
Obsessive 7 (77.8%) 11 (73.3%) 5 (55.6%) 3 (42.9%)
Paranoia 2 (22.2%) 0 0 0
Grandiosity 2 (22.2%) 0 1 (11.1%) 0
Irrational 5 (55.6%) 0 3 (33.3%) 0
Delusional 4 (44.4%) 0 3 (33.3%) 0
Unspecified mental health issue(s) 3 (33.3%) 0 5 (55.6%) 0
Substance abuse 4 (44.4%) 1 (6.7%) 0 0
Potential trauma Refugee 0 1 (6.7%) 0 0
Asylum seeker 0 3 (28%) 0 2 (28.6%)
Loss of significant other 4 (44.4%) 7 (46.7%) 4 (44.4%) 4 (57.1%)
Exposure to extreme violence
(including the internet)
7 (77.8%) 14 (93.3%) 3 (33.3%) 6 (85.7%)
13Note that the hierarchical nature of Figure 1 is for illustration purposes only, and does not infer ‘nested’ sub themes
(i.e., a subtheme below another is not a sub-theme of the one above).
14The sub-theme entitled ‘Psychological issues’ captured those variables that could be categorized under this broad
heading. As shown in Table 3, these included a range of mental illnesses and disorders, syndromes and conditions, as
well as descriptions such as an individual being ‘obsessive’, ‘irrational’ or ‘delusional’. As with all of the data included in
the analyses, when reports of these were from only one single source, this information was excluded.
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underlying variables. For example, this table shows that 11.1% (or 1 out of 9) VLEs
showed evidence of Asperger syndrome (therefore the remaining 88.9% did not), whilst
none of the other groups did.
The number of incidences of each psychological issue was consistently low, with
being ‘obsessive’ scoring highest – and evidenced by all groups to different degrees.
Between-groups comparisons of underlying variables revealed some interesting find-
ings. The first subtheme was based on evidence whereby individuals had been
described as having some kind of mental issue that we categorized as a
‘psychological issue’. Cases where individuals have received a formal diagnosis for a
mental illness were rare, however, there were a number of instances within the data-
set when individuals were said to have been described by others as, for example,
‘obsessional’, ‘depressed’, ‘paranoid’ and ‘irrational’. These cases formed the basis for
the ‘psychological issues’ subtheme, and comparisons revealed some marked differen-
ces between groups. Most notable was that more VLEs were described as having
some kind of psychological issue. However, there a general lack of evidence that
VGEs, NVGEs and NVLEs were likely to have some kind of psychological issue.
This is in line with the literature on this topic which does point toward more lone
extremists having mental health issues compared to group members,18 which was
reflected in our findings. There were also reports of individuals being ‘irrational’,
‘delusional’ and having unspecified mental health issues for more of the lone indi-
viduals (violent and nonviolent) compared to group member extremists.
In terms of sources of potential trauma, around half of individuals in all groups had
experienced the loss of a significant other, and more of the VLEs, VGEs and NVGEs
had been exposed to extremely violent, potentially traumatic materials (mainly via the
internet), whereas NVLEs had not.
The current study indicates that whilst, in general, numbers of cases evidencing
potentially traumatic events were higher for (both lone and group) violent extremists,
far fewer VGEs were reported as having psychological issues. It may be that group
membership provides resilience from suffering from psychological issues due to the ter-
rorist lifestyle, for example, by having others to connect to and share experiences, and
from feelings of belonging and identity. Alternatively, it may be that individuals who
have mental health problems already are refused membership or rejected by extremist
groups, and individuals are ‘filtered out’ by groups not wanting individuals with psycho-
logical problems in their group.19 Indeed, data here (see Theme 3: ‘Grievances’) showed
that more VLEs had been rejected by certain groups and/or significant other, a school
or employer.
Theme 2: Capability and opportunity
This theme comprises three subthemes: (i) physical activities likely to facilitate radical-
ization and extremist-related action, such as attending training camps and traveling
abroad to train and/or meet with influential others, and also when individuals were
reported as being passionate about participating in (team) sports; (ii) opportunities for
(extremist-related) action, such as an open operating environment (where there is a lack
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of security measures) and time on hand to be involved in extremism; and (iii) personal
crisis (Table 4).20
There were clear differences between VGEs and other groups regarding physical
activities that can support and facilitate extremist capabilities. Many more VGEs pre-
sented evidence of these whilst none of the VLEs did, maybe due to opportunities to
train and travel abroad via Islamic extremist networks and support provided by these.
None of the VLEs had trained/traveled abroad, perhaps because these were XRW and
therefore lacked opportunities that are commonly available to Islamic extremists, or
simply because, as we might expect, they were acting alone and so had less access to the
skills and expertise of others and fewer connections to acquire weapons etc. This links
to research that suggests that whilst lone actor terrorists can be dangerous, most are not
highly capable.21 Lone individuals may struggle more to operate in such circumstances
whereas group extremists may find ways to overcome security measures that act as a
barrier, via the support of other group members.
Another interesting finding was that 13 out of the 15 VGEs had all been reported as
being previously passionate about participating in sports. Whilst a review of the social,
psychological and physical benefits of sports is outside of the scope of this article, it is
recognized that there are a number of potential rewards relating to a person’s physical
and mental health whilst also providing a mechanism through which individuals can
interact with others, gain peer acceptance and a sense of belonging. These in turn can
help with a person’s status and self-esteem,22 especially in adolescence.23 For the VGEs
it may have been that whilst in school they were benefitting from these rewards but
that once they left full-time education this stopped. As such, they needed to seek other
activities that could provide group membership and the rewards that come from this,
and joining an extremist group may have been one option open to them. Indeed, a
search for belonging is well recognized as a factor that can motivate young males to
join extremist organizations.24
Analysis of this theme also found that more VLEs and VGEs were seen to be operat-
ing in an environment that allowed them to plan and prepare extremist-related activ-
ities, whilst only a small number of NVLEs were – which may explain why the latter
chose nonviolent action. In terms of a physical opening, there were no clear differences.
However, regarding personal crisis, many more of the violent extremists (VLEs and
VGEs) had experienced a catalyst/crisis, and had expressed a perceived personal respon-
sibility to act. There is empirical research to indicate that major stressors can act as a
‘trigger’ for violent action,25 and that an event that makes something political become
perceived as personal is key to lone actor terrorism.26 Moreover, a terrorist lifestyle may
Table 4. Opportunity and capability across groups of extremists (figures represent n and %).
Subthemes Underlying variables VLE VGE NVLE NVGE
Physical activity Training 0 11 (73.3%) 0 0
Travel abroad 0 11 (73.3%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (11.1%)
Sport 0 13 (86.7%) 0 2 (28.6%)
Physical opportunities Operating environment 8 (88.9%) 14 (93.3%) 2 (22.2%) 5 (71.4%)
Physical opening (time on hands) 5 (55.6%) 13 (86.7%) 9 (100%) 5 (71.4%)
Personal crisis Catalyst/ crisis 5 (55.6%) 10 (66.7%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
Perceived personal responsibility to act 7 (77.8%) 14 (93.3%) 1 (11.1%) 1 (14.3%)
Under-achievement 6 (66.7%) 11 (73.3%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
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lead to traumatic events such as exposure to violence and violent images (some
extremely so), and fear, stress and pressures related to avoiding detection and/or
death.27 These can in themselves lead to psychological issues: That is, being a terrorist
can be psychologically detrimental to those involved.
Theme 3: Grievances
This theme captured those variables related to grievances that might underlie extremist
attitudes and actions (see Table 5). There were two subthemes: (i) ingroup-outgroup
thinking, which covers how extremists perceive themselves in relation to others, and (ii)
exclusion and rejection, which covers how individuals have been treated by others. For
example, feelings of marginalization and that Muslims are being persecuted (e.g. ‘The
West hates Islam’), being (or perceiving to be) rejected by certain groups (including
other extremist groups), being bullied and/or experiencing racism and prejudice, espe-
cially Islamophobia (e.g. ‘Whites against Asians’) and separation from parent(s) that led
to sense of abandonment.
In terms of ingroup-outgroup thinking, in 100% of all cases a perceived external
threat and/or outgroup to blame were evident; that is groups did not differ. However,
there were also notable between-groups differences for other variables. First, perceived
competition for resources was evident for more VLEs, compared to other groups.
Second, a high percentage (100% for some groups) of VGEs, NVLEs and NVGEs per-
ceived a persecution of others and identified with this group of others, whilst a much
smaller number of VLEs did so. These findings suggest that ingroup-outgroup thinking
underlying the grievances of VLEs is, in part, more centered around perceived competi-
tion for resources (possibly because this group comprises of more XRW cases), whereas
for other groups (comprising mainly Islamic extremists) grievances are more relevant to
identifying with a group perceived to be persecuted.
In terms of exclusion and rejection, there was evidence for both lone and group
extremists, but examination of the variables that constitute this subtheme demonstrate
nuanced differences between groups. More VLEs had been rejected by a significant
other, by certain groups and/or by a school or employer, but none had been a victim of
racism (probably because over half of the group was XRW). However, a high percentage
(over 85%) of the group extremists had been a victim of racism and over half of the
VGEs had also been bullied: This is likely to be at least in part attributed to 9/11 and
Table 5. Grievances across groups of extremists (figures represent n and %).
Subthemes Underlying variables VLE VGE NVLE NVGE
Ingroup- outgroup
thinking
Perceived external threat/outgroup to blame 9 (100%) 15 (100%) 9 (100%) 7 (100%)
Perceived competition for resources 6 (66.7%) 0 2 (22.2%) 0
Perceived persecution of others (see below) 4 (49.9%) 15 (100%) 8 (88.9%) 7 (100%)
Identification with a persecuted
others (see above)
3 (33.3%) 15 (100%) 8 (88.9%) 6 (85.7%)
Exclusion, rejection Rejected by significant other 6 (66.7%) 3 (20%) 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%)
Experiences of being bullied 3 (33.3%) 8 (53.3%) 1 (11.1%) 0
Victim of racism/ prejudice 0 14 (93.3%) 0 6 (85.7%)
Rejected by certain group(s) 6 (66.7%) 0 2 (22.2%) 0
Rejected by school/ employer 5 (55.6%) 0 2 (22.2%) 0
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the Islamophobia that followed. Feelings of prejudice, exclusion and marginalization are
widely recognized as key factors underlying extremism. All VGEs were Islamic extrem-
ists, and grew up in a post 9/11 era when they may have been bullied for their religion,
even if they were not especially devout or religious in practice. Moreover, the war in
Iran and other similar events may have led to a perception of Muslims being under
attack. There were also a high percentage of British Asians and immigrants in the VGE
group who may have experienced prejudice against them due to the increase in terrorist
attacks conducted in the name of Islam. VGEs were therefore more likely to have griev-
ances that lead to feelings of marginalization and isolation due to their religion and citi-
zenship, whilst the XRW might have similar feelings but as a result of being rejected by
others (perhaps due to psychological problems and their lack of social skills needed to
‘fit in’).
Theme 4: Identity
This theme is about a person’s identity, in terms of who they are, what they believe in,
how they view themselves and the world, and how they think they should behave.
There are three subthemes relating to a (i) sense of self, (ii) search for purpose and
meaning, and (iii) sense of failure (Table 6).
There were few clear trends in the data for this theme, and there were similarities
between groups for a number of variables indicating that identity may be more about
extremist beliefs than about violent action.
Regarding a sense of self, the most notable differences were that more VGEs pre-
sented a sense of superiority and had deliberately disconnected themselves from other
certain groups (mainly non Muslims, or Muslims perceived to be too moderate – i.e.
not extreme enough). In terms of a search for purpose and meaning, more group
extremists were linked to influential others, and had attempted to connect to likeminded
others via the Internet. The other notable finding was that considerably more of the
VGEs had visited a variety of mosques, had traveled abroad (mainly to Pakistan) and
Table 6. Identity across groups of extremists (figures represent n and percentages).
Subthemes Underlying variables VLE VGE NVLE NVGE
Sexual exploration 1 (11.1%) 0 0 0
Sense of self Seek fame 1 (11.1%) 0 1 (11.1%) 0
Perceived superiority 5 (55.6%) 12 (93.3%) 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%)
Deliberately disconnected self
from certain groups
2 (22.2%) 11 (73.3%) 0 2 (28.6%)
Status seeking 4 (44.4%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
Search for purpose,
meaning
Attempted to connect to LM
others via internet
6 (66.7%) 14 (93.3%) 6 (66.7%) 7 (100%)
Seek like-minded others 7 (77.8%) 15 (100%) 6 (66.7%) 7 (100%)
Ideology 9 (100%) 15 (100%) 9 (100%) 7 (100%)
Links to influential others 4 (44.4%) 15 (100%) 6 (66.7%) 7 (100%)
Visited various mosques 2 (22.2%) 15 (100%) 2 (22.2%) 1 (14.3%)
Exhibited Western (non-Muslim) behaviors 1 (11.1%) 15 (100%) 3 (33.3%) 5 (71.4%)
Sense of failure Lack of social skills 5 (55.6%) 0 3 (33.3%) 0
Low self esteem 7 (77.8%) 1 (6.7%) 1 (11.1%) 0
Sexual frustrations 5 (55.6%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (11.1%) 0
Dropped out of education/ employment 4 (44.4%) 6 (40%) 3 (33.3%) 1 (14.3%)
Under-achieved 6 (66.7%) 11 (73.3%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
Employment 4 (44.4%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 5 (71.4%)
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had conducted ‘Western behaviors’ (e.g. drinking alcohol, having premarital relation-
ships) that would be seen as unacceptable by some strict Muslims. Behaviors conducted
whilst a teenager (that may have been perceived by some as ‘un-Islamic) may have been
attempts to fit in that provided a sense of belonging, but lifestyle and behaviors incon-
gruent to (Muslim) beliefs may have meant that individuals sought ways to repent
when older. It may be that their joining an extremist group may be an attempt to
redress these behaviors and redeem themselves to other Muslims and/or in the eyes of
Allah. Only a small percentage of VLEs had visited various mosques, traveled abroad or
presented such Westernized behaviors, partially due to high numbers of XRW in
this subgroup.
In terms of sense of failure, there were a number of similarities between-groups.
However, more VLEs had low self-esteem (which may be linked to more of this group
having psychological issues) and sexual frustration, and more lone extremists (violent
and nonviolent) lacked social skills. In terms of under-achieving, notably more violent
extremists presented evidence for this variable. It may be that frustrations that result
from a perceived sense of under-achievement, combined with or exaggerated by a sense
of superiority, lead to grievances and an outgroup to blame. However, such grievances
do not inevitably lead to violence: Whilst these can underlie support for violence, they
do not predict violent action.28
Theme 5: Connectedness
This last theme relates to how individuals are connected to other individuals and other
social groups (see Table 7). It comprised two subthemes; the first was about being iso-
lated and alienated, for example a lack of friends or intimate relationships, and being dis-
connected from family or specific social groups. The second related to seeking to belong,
for example by attempting to join certain groups or gangs, or converting to Islam.
This theme is strongly related to the previous theme of ‘Identity’, which determines
how people see themselves fitting in with others, and as such is important to feelings of
connectedness. Unsurprisingly, compared to the group members, more lone extremists
were described as a loner and lacked a significant other and friends. VLEs were the least
socially integrated. Conversely, more VGEs were reported as having a supportive family
Table 7. Connectedness across groups of extremists (figures represent n and %).
Subthemes Underlying variables VLE VGE NVLE NVGE
Isolation, alienation Described as a loner 6 (66.7%) 1 (6.7%) 7 (77.8%) 0
Lack of significant other 6 (66.7%) 4 (26.7%) 6 (66.7%) 4 (57.1%)
Lack of secure/ stable background 4 (44.4%) 6 (40%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
Lack of friends 5 (55.6%) 0 6 (66.7%) 0
Disconnected from family 6 (66.7%) 4 (26.7%) 4 (44.4%) 0
Supportive family background 5 (55.6%) 12 (80%) 5 (55.6%) 4 (57.1%)
Socially integrated 2 (22.5%) 12 (80%) 5 (55.6%) 4 (57.1%)
Seeking to belong Converted to Islam 2 (22.2%) 3 (20%) 0 0
Attempted to join group 6 (66.7%) 15 (100%) 5 (55.4%) 6 (85.7%)
Sought acceptance from certain groups 5 (55.6%) 7 (46.7%) 5 (55.6%) 6 (85.7%)
Connected with Western others 7 (77.8%) 12 (80%) 8 (88.9%) 7 (100%)
Gang membership 2 (22.2%) 5 (33.3%) 0 1 (20%)
Team membership 1 (11.1%) 13 (86.7%) 0 2 (28.6%)
Status seeking 4 (44.4%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (33.3%) 2 (28.6%)
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background, as being socially integrated, as having a significant other (i.e. more VGEs
had a partner or spouse), and had sought team membership.
VLE cases studies included information about individuals needing a belief system in
order to have a sense of purpose and meaning. Often feelings of inferiority, exclusion,
and a lack of belonging were reported, which all relate to low self-esteem. This may
have been at least in part due to psychological issues and problems regarding social
interactions with others. VGEs had similarly been rejected and marginalized, but for dif-
ferent reasons: mainly due to their religion, citizenship, race and so on. Identity is espe-
cially important during adolescence - when individuals are much more self-conscious
about their identity,29 and begin to think about how this relates to the rest of their
life.30 This is when VGEs were most likely to experience prejudice and bullying, and
being young, adolescent and male are features of increased vulnerability to extremist
influences. However, our data showed no clear trends/large differences between groups,
suggesting that whilst identity is related to extremist views, it does not dictate a prefer-
ence for violent or nonviolent behavior.
Overall discussion
The main aim of the current research was to investigate the similarities and differences
between violent and nonviolent group and lone-actor extremists. Traditionally, research
has described terrorism as a social phenomenon that is inspired by and facilitated by
group interactions and the rewards associated with this.31 However, it is now recognized
that extremist individuals acting alone pose a real and serious threat to security. The
current research was an exploratory study that compared lone and group member
extremists, who had acted violently or not. CSR was applied here to examine in-depth a
substantial amount of data from different sources. Critics of CSR argue that observing a
single individual or group at one time results merely in a snapshot that is highly con-
text-dependent and therefore not generalizable.32 However, we take a number of closely
related cases and show homogeneity and heterogeneity between them; therefore, allow-
ing an in-depth review of the four types of extremists.
There are two key take-home messages from this study. First, analysis of all cases
identified a large number of variables shared by the different types of extremists studied
here. These are variables that underlie extremism in general (i.e. extremist beliefs and
attitudes) but do not explain behavioral differences. The second take-home message is
that there were some striking differences between groups, and some variables do seem
to distinguish between groups, which might explain how and why some individuals con-
duct violent acts whilst others do not, as part of a group or alone. These include: many
more violent extremists (VLEs and VGEs) had been rejected by others (VLEs had been
rejected by a significant other and by a group, VGEs had been victims of racism and
prejudice), experienced a perceived personal responsibility to act, a sense of under-
achievement and a sense of superiority. This indicates that these factors may motivate
violent action(s). Moreover, more lone extremists lacked a significant other and friends,
and many more VLEs present evidence of psychological issues, lacked social skills, self-
esteem and were reported to have sexual frustrations. These may have contributed to an
ideology that was a mix of extremist views but also personal grievances and issues.
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Interestingly, many more VGEs had access to capabilities needed for violent attacks, for
example via training, travel abroad, and links to other extremists. And many more vio-
lent extremists (VLEs and VGEs) had experienced a personal crisis that may have pro-
vided an impetus and a psychological preparedness to act violently.
The COM-B model has been developed mainly for the area of Health Psychology,33
but may be applicable to Defense and Security problems since it purports to be a simple
model that can explain behaviors in general. The COM-B model posits that Capability
(C), Opportunity (O) and Motivation (M) are all required for Behavior (B) to occur:
This concurs with others who propose that acts of terrorism occur when capability,
opportunity and motivation meet.34 Most of the data in the case studies analyzed here
relates to the motivation of extremists, however, for violent action to be conducted,
opportunities (for example, to plan, prepare for and conduct an attack) and capabilities
(physical and psychological) are also key. This study showed differences between groups
regarding capability, opportunity and motivation. It may be that whilst nonviolent
extremists hold extremist views, they may either lack the motivation to act violently, or
lack the capability or opportunity to do so. Although motivation is required, it does not
necessarily lead to violent action:35 Capability (psychological and physical) to conduct a
violent act and the opportunity to do so are also required. Indeed, whilst we know that
beliefs do matter, they rarely predict violence, for example most violent extremists are
not the most ideologically radicalized.36
Further research is required to better understand why those at risk choose not to get
involved in violent extremism, and also to explore differences between lone and group
member extremists. These are likely to be hindered or facilitated by links (or lack of
links) to others in order to develop capabilities and opportunities required for a violent
attack. This may influence behavioral outcomes, for example lone actor attacks may be
less complex and sophisticated compared to those conducted by groups of individuals.
Data collection for future studies should therefore enable understanding of capability
and opportunity as well as motivation, and the application of the COM-B model to bet-
ter understand extremism should be considered. In particular, to understand how, when
and why capability (psychological and physical) and opportunity (physical and social)
influences the behavioral choices of those with extremist views, and how to apply the
COM-B model to prevent or counter violent extremism. Countering and preventing ter-
rorism requires elimination of capability, opportunity and/or motivation;37 therefore
interventions need to, for example: prevent radicalization (motivation); immunize
against violent ideologies (motivation); identify and disengage individuals (capability,
opportunity).38 Moreover, if most nonviolent extremists lack at least one of the three
key components needed for (violent) behavior, this can be useful for those responsible
for risk assessment – to decide if an individual is simply not motivated to be violent
(and is therefore less of a risk), or is nonviolent because they lack capability and/or
opportunity (and is therefore higher risk).
Further research is also needed to understand the moderating and mediating effects
between different push, pull, protective and risk factors. For example, how marginaliza-
tion and a rejection by others together with a sense of under-achievement may have led
to individuals seeking an alternative identity, ways to belong, and seek meaning and
purpose via extremist activities. A lack of identity and connectedness may present a
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personal crisis, whereby individuals are particularly susceptible to extremist influences.
Extremism may be seen to provide a link to like-minded others, a sense of self and
belonging and an opportunity to connect and be part of a group and something bigger
(even for lone extremists, but perceive to achieve this via online connections).
Extremism may also be perceived as a means to achieving status and respect, which are
sought by those suffering from low self-esteem. As such, whilst a lack of identity’ may
not be sufficient for violence, the rewards associated with extremism, plus grievances
and identification of an outgroup to blame may contribute to the ‘perfect storm’ of fac-
tors that result in violent (lone or group) extremist action. Moreover, for Islamic
extremists, extremism may be seen as a way to repent for previous ‘non Muslim’ behav-
iors and a way of overcoming feelings of marginalization and prejudice experienced for
being a Muslim. For the XRW it may be a way to (seemingly) connect to others and
find a way of fitting in, when psychological issues and lack of social skills have other-
wise made this difficult.
Future research may also inform those responsible for the upstream detection of vio-
lent actors. Regarding cues that might be used for those wanting to detect violent actors,
it seems that most religiously inspired lone actor terrorists are likely to tell friends and
families of their motivations and intentions, whilst the XRW are more likely to tell peo-
ple online.39 Moreover, lone actor terrorists may tend to lack the ability to maintain
operational security and often leak cues regarding their motivation and intentions.40 In
the current study there was insufficient data to compare groups on these measures,
however there were some marked differences regarding physical activities. VGEs stood
out from other subgroups because a high percentage of VGEs had been involved in
extremist-related training activities, had traveled abroad and had been reported as pas-
sionate about participating in (team) sports. None of the VLEs scored for these meas-
ures, and only one NVLE and one NVGE. This indicates that for law enforcement and
CT practitioners, more VGEs might be detected via these behaviors, but this will not be
the case for lone extremists.
Limitations and challenges for research in this area
There are several limitations to the current study. One was that finding cases that were
of sufficient detail and could be easily categorized as violent or nonviolent was difficult,
especially for the NVEs: Few such cases were reported, and when they were, the amount
and level of detail available was often sparse, which indicated a reporting bias where
violent cases attract more attention and therefore generate more data. There was also
the issue of how to make sense of missing data: Did this mean that the variable did not
exist for that individual or just that it had not been reported?15 Whilst efforts were
made to verify information for all cases, there remains a risk that missing data was mis-
interpreted. Future studies may consider instead categorizing these types of cases as
‘unknown’.41 It was also sometimes difficult to categorize individuals as violent or non-
violent, and as lone or as a group member, which led to the exclusion of a number of
cases. We are also mindful that some readers may not agree with how we categorized
15This is a typical limitation of research like this, and the best approach is to use multiple sources of information to
analyze, and multiple cases per group – both of which were attempted in the current study.
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some individuals as ‘violent’ before they had conducted an act of violence (i.e. they had
been disrupted by law enforcement), when we are aware that they may not have gone
on to conduct the act. We chose to take those cases where individuals were convicted
on substantial evidence that they would have acted if not disrupted.
Another limitation of this study is that this study included only a small sample, and
focused on individuals in the U.K. who were convicted of extremist-related offenses.
Therefore our results might be biased in that we exclude (i) extremists from other coun-
tries, (ii) those who are not disrupted or caught, (iii) nonviolent extremists who have
not committed criminal acts. We recognize these limitations which were a result mainly
of a desire to focus on this specific population and issues regarding the categorization
of cases which we did not anticipate pre data collection. Moreover, the threat may have
changed (the data was collected and case studies were developed between 2011-2015).
Therefore cases may not be representative of more recent threats, for example when a
vehicle is the weapon of choice. There have been a number of terrorist attacks since
2015; examining data regarding these more recent events will enable future research to
examine this question and allow for a larger sample size to analyze.
The above links to another issue with the current study, in that the distribution of
Islamic and XRW individuals was not even across different subgroups, in fact all XRW
cases were lone actors and all group-based cases were Islamic extremist. It is therefore
difficult to know when ideology is driving different behavioral outcomes. The fact that
we did not find any XRW individuals in our VGE sample is interesting in itself, and
deserves an exploration of why this was the case. We need to ask why all group attacks
were ideologically-focused, whether VGE is somehow more appealing to Islamic-
inspired individuals and whether lone actor terrorism is for some reason more appeal-
ing to the XRW. Alternatively, it might be that data available are influenced by, for
example, reporting bias where group member XRW does not attract the attention of the
media and/or is less likely to be pursued by law enforcement agencies for some reason.
Certainly in the U.K. the XRW is now recognized as a real and serious threat, and it
was announced in July 2019 that it will now be included in official threat-level warn-
ings. Since data was collected for this study, there have been more high profile XRW
attacks and therefore future research may investigate this in more detail than we were
able to.
Another challenge for future research is that this study demonstrated that it is often
difficult to categorize individuals as lone or not. Several attempts have been made to
identify and describe different subtypes of lone actors,42 whilst others have proposed
that ‘loneness’ should be understood as on a continuum.43 With the rise of the internet
it is argued that it is in fact impossible to exist without others having some kind of an
influence, and as such the concept of ‘loneness’ itself needs serious reconsideration.44
Moreover, loneness may be voluntary, whereby the individual has removed themselves
from others (e.g. because they perceive others as not radical enough, or as not acting
where required) or involuntary (e.g. they have been refused group membership, they do
not meet selection criteria, or they have been rejected from a group).45
If we accept that extremists are likely to sit on a continuum in terms of how ‘lone’
they are (and possibly how violent they are), then it is problematic to exclude those
who sit near the middle of the axis. For the purpose of this study, we needed to
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categorize individuals as representing one of four subgroups, and so we only included
those that were away from the mid-point and towards the more extreme points in terms
of whether their behavior was violent or nonviolent, and whether they were operating
as part of a group or alone. Future studies need to consider whether this issue can be
overcome to include the types of extremists that were excluded from this study, in order
to develop a more nuanced understanding of the different types of extremism.
Conclusion
Previously, unsuccessful attempts by researchers to identify a terrorist profile have led
to the agreement that this approach is futile.46 However, more recently it has been pro-
posed that if we disaggregate our categorization of ‘terrorists’ into more specific, distinct
groups, there might be some shared characteristics that represent these different types
of extremists.47 The current study took an empirical approach to identify why and how
individuals with similar (extremist) perspectives reached different behavioral outcomes,
in terms of acting violently or not, alone or as part of a group. Findings may therefore
assist practitioners, to better understand and identify high risk individuals and to tailor
interventions for different types of individuals and groups. More empirical research is
now needed in order to verify these findings, to explore the different roles within
groups such as those who procure weapons and facilitate acts of violence compared to
those directly engaged in violence and to develop a more nuanced understanding of the
similarities and differences between lone and group extremists.
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